

**A Slave Who Would Be King: Oral Tradition and Archaeology of the Recent Past in
a Portion of the Upper Senegal River Basin**

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13th Congress of the Pan African Archaeological Association; Dakar, Senegal.

Session: Sabodala Cultural Heritage Project, November 3, 2010

The past is never dead. It's not even past.

-William Faulkner, *Requiem for a Nun*, 1951

As African countries prepare for a dramatic increase in cultural heritage studies performed to comply with laws and international conventions regulating economic development, it is imperative that those performing these studies understand their roles and the potentially transformative power they hold. Many cultural heritage specialists, including the authors, were trained as archaeologists. Even those of us who were trained in the wider discipline of anthropology, feel much more comfortable treating tangible heritage—objects, sites, ruins, monuments, and sacred places—than the intangible elements of culture, such as folklore, language, songs, and dance. Even with tangible heritage, we are more at home placing these resources in their archaeological or historical context than in assessing the cultural values that living communities place on them. Yet it is in the latter realm that we are most needed, for economic development often shreds the historic fabric of a community, and with it the social ties that bind a community together.

The past is not a simple linear construction of events leading to the present. It is a complex, evolving, and ever-changing narrative that reinforces mores and norms, as well as social and political relationships (Lowenthal 1985). Discerning these relationships and judging how far they can be twisted and turned is the job of a cultural heritage specialist. But in doing this job, a heritage specialist must guard against becoming, unwittingly, the very agent of the type of change we seek to prevent.

This paper is a story within a story. Like so many in West Africa, this story involves gold and slaves, past and present, and the complex ways these elements are bound into the fabric of society. We begin with a deceptively simple narrative. In 2008, the Oromin Joint Venture Group (OJVG) was awarded a 240-km² Sabodala mining concession in the upper Senegal River basin by the Senegalese government (Figure 1). OJVG proceeded to develop a mining plan and perform baseline studies for an environmental and social

impact assessment (ESIA). Archaeology and cultural heritage were identified as areas of concern for the ESIA. An international team under the auspices of Statistical Research, Inc. (USA), and Nexus Heritage (UK) worked alongside Senegalese colleagues from the Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire (IFAN), to complete the first-ever baseline cultural heritage studies to international standards for an ESIA in Senegal (Altschul, J. et al. 2010). In all, 251 archaeological and 46 traditional sacred sites were discovered and evaluated; management plans were developed to minimize the mine's impact on these sites. Most were avoided, but in cases where sites had to be disturbed, scientific excavation and traditional treatments were forwarded as the means to mitigate the mine's effect.

Tucked inside this narrative are two stories. The first shows how the past informs present social relationships among the 11 villages that claim land within the OJVG Sabodala concession. It is told by the griots, the traditional historians and storytellers of the villages, and concerns a slave, Tobri Sidibe, who rose to become king of Beledougou, the small-scale Malinke and Peul polity that encompassed the Sabodala region in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see Figure 1). The second story concerns us as cultural heritage specialists—how we gather information that connects the past with the present and what we do about it. We begin the paper by stitching the oral histories we gathered together into one coherent origin story for the villages in the region. Next, we place the oral histories into a larger historical context, revealing a logical structure about how present-day villages came to be and how villagers are supposed to relate to each other. The archaeology of the concession is then overlaid on the historical context, exposing its potential to be used by different groups for their own ends. To our surprise, we find that the knowledge we possess has the potential to alter cultural dynamics in ways we cannot predict. We close with a brief discussion of our own quandary about our role in cultural heritage studies.

Oral History

When asked how their village came to be, the griots spun wonderful tales of magic, sorcery, romance, treachery, war, bravery, and, ultimately, triumph that led to the present state of affairs. Although different in detail, the stories wove common themes together around a set of similar historic or mythical events. Combined, these result in the following tale.

In the distant past, Beledougou fell under the control of the Peul-speaking slave known as Tobri Sidibe. Tobri gained control over water sources—most particularly, a well upon which the entire countryside depended for water. He demanded that the inhabitants pay him gold before being allowed to fetch water from the well. In response, the resident Soumare appealed to the Cissokho chief of Tomara (in modern Mali), Sanga (or Sora) Moussa for help. The chief sent two of his sons, Dan Moussa and Dan Sirima, to oust Tobri from power. Tradition has it that Dan Moussa was responsible for evicting Tobri,

eventually killing him. But according to many, this eventuality would not have been possible without the help of his sister Dan Manian. Tobri knew magic that made him invincible. Dan Manian allegedly seduced Tobri, who married her despite the warnings of his entourage. Dan Manian refused to consummate her marriage unless Tobri revealed to her the secrets of his powers. One night was sufficient for Dan Manian to learn the secret of Tobri's invincibility. Her brothers decapitated Tobri, and no child was born from the marriage. Dan Moussa became chief of Beledougou; his brother, Dan Sirima, became the chief of Sirimana. Their Cissokho descendants have held the chieftaincy of all the villages in Beledougou and Sirimana ever since.

As for the descendants of Tobri Sidibe, they were banned from the chieftaincy and from intermarrying with members of the Cissokho lineage. They were allowed to remain, however, in some of the villages of Beledougou, where they had their own neighborhoods. According to Boubou Kanouté (one of the local griots), Tobri's descendants were ethnic Peul, who were eventually absorbed in Malinke culture and society and now speak Malinke.

This folktale is the origin or foundation story that explains how and why the Cissokho lineages from Tomara ousted the Soninke and Peul and assumed political domination. Once in power, the Cissokho refused to return to their homeland and instead maintained control over the chieftaincy of Beledougou at the expense of the Soumare.

The context of the story is interesting; it has no overtly Islamic elements and should therefore predate the forced conversions of the mid-nineteenth-century. The established elite at the time were the Soninke Soumare. The patronymic *Sidibe* indicates that Tobri was a Peul. In the story, he was a slave who somehow acquired great powers and became a king. Was he a mercenary slave warrior who took control of the region's water (the well that all must pay gold to drink from in the story) and trade routes and assumed the status of his noble/merchant owner?

Three important conclusions can be drawn from the story of the Peul Tobri Sidibe and his encounter with the Cissokho lineage of Malinke origin. First, some of the Peul speakers in the area are probably descendants of Tobri—their ancestors most likely arrived in the region before members of the Cissokho lineages. The traditions collected also suggest that the Soumare, who were Soninke speakers, were already present in the region before the Peul and the Malinke. Second, the context of the narrative likely situates Tobri Sidibe between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, coinciding with the birth and growth of Boundou and Fouta Djallon (Barry 1988; Boulègue 1987; Gomez 1992). Both polities were founded by Halpulaar- or Peul-speaking Muslim clerics. It is likely that the ancestors of most Peul speakers in Beledougou, and our study area in particular, arrived in the region at this time. Third, Tobri's mystical powers are apparently non-Islamic. Whether

the story of the marriage of Tobri and Dan Manian is an anachronism, parts of the narrative apparently have been censored, because aspects are now considered taboo.

The confiscation of political power by the Cissokho ruling lineage from the Soumare still resonates with members of both groups. Although the identity and fate of Tobri Sidibe's descendants is unknown, all Peul speakers are treated as though they are responsible for Tobri's excesses. Peul speakers have been excluded from political office since the establishment of the Cissokho ruling lineage in the area.

Modern Settlement

The OJVG Sabodala mining concession is located in the far southeast corner of Senegal (see Figure 1). The landscape is hilly and arid, and hills create a divide between the river basins of the Senegal River to the north and east and the Gambia River to the south and west (see Figure 1). The region receives nearly 1 m of annual precipitation, mostly as rain falling between June and September, when low-lying areas are inundated. After the brush is cleared, primarily by fire, relatively small plots are cultivated, mostly with sorghum and millet. Good agricultural land is at a premium. Fields tend to become exhausted relatively quickly, requiring long-term fallow. The farming regime can be characterized as "extensive," with each farmer requiring multiple fields (Homburg and Beye 2010).

The lack of high-quality agricultural land is cited as the prime reason for individual mobility between settlements, fissioning of communities, and the abandonment of villages. This response is consistent with the history of village development. The oldest village in the concession is Mamakhono, which was established around A.D. 1340, according to oral traditions collected in the area. The remaining villages, however, are quite young. All are less than 100 years old, with several established after World War II. The village histories are also consistent with settlement mobility. Most settlements are abandoned within a few generations—some within a single generation. The reasons cited include family disputes and catastrophic events, such as epidemics. The most frequent reason given, however, was that residents simply could not grow sufficient crops to support their families.

Today, the villages are inhabited by two ethnic groups: the Malinke (the socially dominant group, who, according to the oral history, were invited in by the Soumare to liberate the region and then stayed and absorbed the Soumare) and Peul (whose low status is linked to Tobri's excesses and their slave past). The Malinke are primarily agriculturists, whereas the Peul are largely pastoralists. Society in the villages of the OJVG concession is stratified into three distinct social classes: nobles and freeman warriors at the top, craftsmen and musicians in the middle, and the most-numerous, albeit socially despised,

Peul at the bottom. As mentioned above, the Cissokho lineages hold the chieftaincy in all but one of the villages. It is a mistake, however, to view the Cissokho as a united group. Internally, there is a tremendous amount of infighting among the lineages. Kinship ties are often fictive and a matter of convenience. The Peul, who were once slaves, still carry the onus of prior enslavement. Peul speakers are allowed to live in all the villages but cannot hold political office in most of them.

To understand how this sociopolitical structure evolved, it is necessary to place the OJVG Sabodala concession in a larger regional context. To do so, we return to our historical narrative, this time using historical documents instead of oral history.

Historical Narrative

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were characterized by the expansion of slavery and the rise of what were known in the Senegambia as *ceddo* regimes. To maintain power, these regimes employed slave armies that specialized in war and pillage. In many cases, these slave armies became so powerful that they wrested political control from their clients and established their own dynasties (Barry 1988; Bathily 1989; Roberts 1987; Thiaw 1999). Historically, most of the Soninke and Malinke polities in the upper Senegal region were prosperous because of their involvement and experience in trade. They were also heavily invested in slavery; merchants acquired slaves to produce marketable agricultural surpluses (Manchuelle 1997). Senegalese historian Abdoulaye Bathily (1989) referred to these polities as political dwarfs but economic giants.

The Malinke descend from the medieval empire of Mali, whose heartland was located in modern Mali and Guinea. Malinke speakers first began arriving in the upper Senegal after the military and trade expansion of the Empire of Mali in the thirteenth century (Niane 1989). Traditionally, Malinke have been agriculturists, merchants, and hunters. They are associated with powerful secret societies like *komo*, *poro*, and the *kankourang*; the latter was included in 2008 on the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (UNESCO 2003).

Historically and culturally, Peul (or Fulani or Fulbe) belong to a larger ethnic family referred to in the Senegambia as Halpulaar. Peul are generally associated with nomadic pastoralism. Although travelling seasonally with their cattle is an important feature of their lifestyle, some communities, like the Toucouleur, adopted a more sedentary lifestyle, becoming agriculturists. Halpulaar speakers also played a critical role in the spread of Islam in the region. They founded the theocracies of Boundou, Fouta Toro, and Fouta Djallon in the eighteenth century.

With the expansion of European colonialism in the region in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Toucouleur El Hadj Umar Tall initiated a jihad known as *fergo*, which involved massive population movements between the middle and upper Senegal River valleys as well as parts of modern Mali (Robinson 1985). The mobility of the Halpulaar and their association with Islam was a major source of conflict with modern sedentary agriculturist communities, who generally practiced local variants of traditional African religions.

Two forces were probably at play: a background trajectory of slow, organic population growth impacted by occasional influxes of new ethnic groups. The net result was that older groups were pushed into more marginal areas or simply subsumed. In the mid- to late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came the Malinke (e.g. Cissokho), who competed against the Halpulaar theocracies of Boundou and Fouta Djallon. The Malinke intrusion is loosely contemporaneous with the imposition of the colonial government, the abolition of slavery, and the development of legitimate trade. The intrusion also coincides with the movement of escaped or freed slaves away from their masters and toward the coastal towns of the Senegambia (Manchuelle 1989a; Manchuelle 1989b; Roberts and Klein 1980).

The late-nineteenth century is when Beledougou was effectively converted to Islam by Umar's jihad. Certainly Islam was present earlier, and conversion to the new religion was occurring at a slow but steady pace when the region got caught up in broader historical events affecting all of West Africa. In the mid-nineteenth century, El Hadj Umar Tall swept through the upper Senegal River region on a jihad aimed at forcibly converting all "nonbelievers" to Islam. Folklore recounted to us links the site and area of Makhana to Sheikh Umar (Site 24 in Figure 2). This episode involved large, forcible population movements in the middle Senegal River, upper Senegal River, and Mali areas, likely sweeping across Beledougou on numerous occasions. The Halpulaar jihad of Umar precipitated major conflicts with settled agriculturists (Malinke).

The jihad of Umar was not simply or solely an Islamic movement; it was also anticolonial in nature. France had assumed colonial hegemony in the mid-nineteenth century, with consequent impacts on local societies and polities. The French were also responsible for serious dislocations of traditional trade routes (especially impacting the gold trade). The legal abolition of slavery occurred in the earlier nineteenth century. It continued to be practiced, however, even though slavery was increasingly frowned upon.

At this time, Beledougou could be called a "refugium," attracting runaway slaves and others fearful of being enslaved. Social relations were in flux as village-based societies

were pressed by the spread of Islam and affected by ethnic tensions, French colonial effects, and, throughout, a heightened exploitation of and trade in gold (Bathily 1989; Curtin 1973). Not surprisingly, this period is one of social stress and instability and is characterized by rapid social, economic, and political changes.

Archaeology

The oral histories collected from the study area are used today to justify and explain village sociopolitical structure and social relations. These oral histories, their mythological and supernatural elements notwithstanding, appear to be consistent with the large-scale historical events and processes that have resulted in modern West Africa. But are the oral histories true? Was there a slave named Tobri Sidibe who rose to become a king? How would we know? And what would it mean to the villagers of the study area? Here we turn from the intangible to the tangible, from storytelling to science, from griots to archaeologists.

As part of the baseline studies for the ESIA, we performed a systematic archaeological survey of the proposed mine's area of direct impact (ADI) (see Figure 2), as well as a judgmental archaeological survey of the rest of the concession. We identified 251 archaeological sites, which were classified into the following categories: resource-processing sites (113), field houses (83), farmsteads (32), hamlets (7), villages (5), polities (3), ideological/sacred sites (7), and uncategorized (1). With the exception of the last category, the site classes largely follow ethnographic observations and interviews that divide sites on the basis of function. Resource-processing sites, which are distinguished by relatively sparse surface artifact scatters, tend to be camps or locations where one or a few individuals performed a restricted set of activities focused on a particular resource. Modern activities that result in such sites include hunting, plant-gathering, collection of wood products, and livestock herding. As the name implies, field houses are critical components of the agricultural system. In Sabodala, the remains of most field houses are recognized by stone circles 1–3 m in diameter that are used today primarily as the foundations for huts but can also serve as the foundations of sun shelters, storage facilities, and other specialized facilities. Farmers use field houses routinely throughout the growing season to store tools or as temporary shelter. Field houses also figure in other activities. For example, today, young boys often camp at field houses just before the harvest, hunting monkeys and other animals that are attracted to the ripening crops.

Ideological and sacred sites are an eclectic mix of possible burial cairns/graves, tumuli, and collections of cupules. They differ from the ethnographic sacred sites in that no interviewee mentioned them. However, they are similar in all other ways to 46 sacred sites that were documented as part of the ethnographic fieldwork.

The remaining site classes are all residential. These form a continuum from residences of single families (farmsteads), lineages (hamlets), and multiple lineages (villages) to regional centers of political power (polities). At the apex of the settlement system, we defined two polities (one polity center was separated into two sites), each of which probably contained several hundred people from all or most ethnic groups and social classes in the region (see Figure 2).

One of these polities lay within the ADI of the gold mine; the other was located within the concession but in an area unlikely to be affected by development. Because of its potential vulnerability, much of our effort was devoted to the former polity, located in an area known as Masato.

The Masato complex consists of five sites located on a broad plateau surrounded by hills on all sides but the northeast (Figure 3). The hills make it largely inaccessible on three sides, and it commands an excellent view of the drainage below the complex. Most other villages in the study area are located on or near valley floors, near water and close to agricultural fields. The Masato complex appears to have been one of the few sites in the study area situated primarily for defense.

The Masato sites were discovered at various times in different phases of work, and the attribution of them all to a single complex was arrived at in analysis (the sites are shown in the inset of Figure 3). Site 9 is the westernmost and consists of 7 stone circles; it was probably a single-family residential complex. Site 11, to the south, is larger, with 11 stone features; Site 79 is of a similar size. Site 78, at the lower, eastern end of the plateau, is slightly smaller, with 8 features. All of these loci contained artifact scatters of ceramics and ground stone milling basins.

In the center of the plateau is Site 8, the most prominent aspect of which is a walled enclosure encompassing an area of about 2,000 m² (Figure 3 inset). There is not enough stone present to make the enclosure wall a defensible barrier, suggesting that it must have been largely a symbolic barrier or division. The eastern half of the enclosure appears residential in nature. Here, we found a handful of stone circles, most likely hut foundations (Features 47–50 in the Figure 3 inset). To the west of the stone circles are cigar-shaped stone features that have tentatively been identified as burials (Features 40–46). In the southwest sector of the enclosure is the foundation of a mosque (Feature 57), with what appear to be public spaces to the north and west. There may even be the remains of the public washing place for worshippers entering the mosque (Features 58–60). Outside the enclosure wall are stone circles that easily number more than 100, particularly when those from the other four sites are added into the total. We hypothesized that one of the

functions of the enclosure walls was to separate the chiefly, political, and religious elites from common freemen and slaves.

During the course of our archaeological sample excavations at Site 8, one of our local laborers evinced familiarity with the site. We asked him what he knew of its origin or history. He replied simply that this was Tobri Sidibe's site. So the fantastic tales of magic, sorcery, and legendary, godlike feats might have a historical basis. This revelation elicited more curiosity—if not outright skepticism—than shock. How do we account for the mosque given the apparent non-Islamic nature of the Sidibe story?

In the Senegambia, as in most of West Africa, Islam is generally syncretic and well accommodated with local religions (Levtzion 1994; Tringham 1962). Therefore, a mosque may not have been that unusual in a village composed primarily of non-Muslims. Society in Sidibe's time was undergoing tremendous social upheaval. The population might have been a mixture of Muslims and followers of traditional African religions. In many instances, Islam cohabited peacefully with local African religions. Initial conversion concerned mainly the elites and the merchant class, who used it to tap into the trans-Saharan trade. It was only in the nineteenth century that Islam and its backers became militant. Test excavations of the possible mosque at Site 8 provided clues about the manner in which the structure was built, but not about the building's function or nature. These are left to future investigations.

Another curious aspect of the "Sidibe polity" is, quite simply, its small size. Compared to modern villages, such as Mamakhono or Sabodala, an enclosure of 2,000 m² and a settlement of about 100 huts is very small for a village, particularly one that was the center of a polity. It is possible that the polity's population was dispersed in settlements throughout the valley dominated by the Masato complex. Of relevance to this line of inquiry is Site 123 (see Figure 2), a small village site with an enclosure at the exact opposite end of the valley dominated by the Masato complex (Altschul, J. et al. 2010, p. 5.54). The precise relationship between Masato and Site 123 is unclear; they could have been rivals, or Site 123 could have been a "vassal" village. If the latter was the case, then Sidibe's polity may have consisted of a dispersed settlement with a reasonably sized population.

The ceramic evidence at Masato does not suggest a long-lived settlement. This inference is consistent with the folk history. The small size and limited lifespan of such a settlement is consistent with a fluid settlement system and political power based on personal charisma and authority as the basis for social dominance. If the personal basis for social power was disrupted—as by the death of Sidibe—then the system should have fragmented and the settlements dispersed. Our assumption is that the settlers at Masato split off from their parent community in Mamakhono. According to folk history, these lineages eventually

moved back to Mamakhono when the reasons for the split had been resolved. Was this upon the demise of Sidibe at the hands of the incoming Cissokho warriors?

Coinciding Narratives

The coincidence of the three narratives of oral history, history, and archaeology at Masato put us in possession of knowledge that could greatly affect local communities in ways that could not be predicted. For the Cissokho, their status as village chiefs rests almost exclusively on their social legitimacy. The lineages go to extremes to protect that legitimacy, including devising fictive kinship ties and showing public unity while plotting against one another. They may well view the archaeology at Masato as a threat to their power. As village chiefs, the Cissokho have a privileged position in consulting with the mining company and negotiating for “prizes” such as jobs, land, water, and money. If Masato can be confirmed as Sidibe’s site, then it would stand to reason that the mining company and the Senegalese government would want to consult with the affected descendant community, which in this case would be the Peul-speaking community. Peul speakers, Tobri’s descendants in particular, would have a say for the first time in generations in the disposition of prizes—and with that real political power. The social order in the villages of the concession would never be the same. Our endeavor to preserve cultural heritage would in part be the causal agent of culture change.

The role of the anthropologist is often presented as resting on one basic premise: “do no harm”—the cornerstone of the ethical code of the American Anthropological Association. But cultural heritage specialists, while generally trained in archaeology and/or anthropology and often using archaeological and anthropological methods, do not actually practice either archaeology or anthropology as they are understood by academia. The academic disciplines of archaeology and anthropology are interested in researching human behavior, whereas cultural heritage is a consultative process by which the public interest in balancing development and historic and cultural values is best achieved. Thus, while “do no harm” is a nice catchphrase, it has nothing to do with cultural heritage studies. Our job is to provide information on past and present culture to affected local, regional, and national publics in ways that they can be understood and to help those stakeholders (which includes the project sponsor, government, and local communities) make the best decision for them about a particular development project (recognizing, of course, that a different set of publics could come to a different solution).

Cultures are not fossils. Our goal is not to keep local communities from changing. Our job is to listen carefully to the desires of the affected communities and to establish programs that have the greatest potential for achieving their desires for the future (jobs, education, health, etc.) at the same time protecting those values that they want to save (language, folklore, history, culture, etc.). In short, not only is “do no harm” not helpful, it’s wrong—

we want to do *good*. “Good,” however, is not easily defined, and attempting to “do good” in complex and contested social and political contexts can have unintended and unpredictable consequences (see, e.g., Brumfiel 2003).

Although we want to do good, or at least see the fruits of our labors used to do good, we must realize that “doing good” is socially contingent. It is often the case that local communities will make decisions about development which we strongly believe is not in their best interests. But we do not have a right to decide how stakeholders use the knowledge we provide. It is not our job to ensure that local communities make good decisions about development—we are not here to save Africa from Africans. As importantly, we need to recognize that our life experiences affect our judgment of “good.” African and American/European cultural heritage specialists will have different perspectives on what “should” be done. Neither is relevant, and if we do our jobs right, neither should come into play.

One of the major cultural issues affecting West Africa is the legacy of slavery. Different communities have different ways of dealing with the effects of slavery. Some ignore it; others embrace it; most fall between these two extremes. Slavery, of course, is a concept with a lot of cultural baggage. Some Europeans and Americans of European descent have a sense of collective guilt, whereas Africans, particularly the educated class, prefer to view slavery as something done to them without acknowledging the fact that slavery has a long history in Africa that pre- and postdates the European slave trade (see Thiaw 2003).

As cultural heritage specialists, we have a special concern to make sure that our personal feelings about slavery do not affect how we do our job. In Sabodala, the legacy of slavery is incorporated into the social structure. Following UNESCO conventions, it would be easy to argue that our job is to empower those elements of society that have been structurally disadvantaged. In the case of Masato, where there is some evidence that the site was the center of power of an ethnic group that has been displaced and dispossessed of its social and economic standing and possessions, should we allow descendants of this group to decide the fate of this site even if that might disrupt the underlying social structure of society?

We have no intention of drawing the question too boldly. Our point here is that cultural heritage specialists, in spite of our efforts, become part of the story—part of the evolution of culture and society—by virtue of what we ask, how we ask it, and who we inform. Thus, we need to take responsibility for our actions. But it is not our job to be social engineers, to provide or hold back information because we want to maintain or change society. We must always be mindful that our job is to provide local communities with the most accurate information possible about their past and to offer them the opportunity and

freedom to make their own decisions. The more we empower local communities, the better we have done our job.

It seems likely that some sites in the Sabodala study area—archaeological as well as traditional sacred properties—provide tangible links between the current villages and a highly contested and emotionally charged past. In consulting with the communities and providing them with information, we are likely to set in motion social forces that we cannot and should not control. We do not do so lightly, but do so we must. “Knowledge is power”, one Native American elder once told the senior author, “You have it and we want it.”

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the Oromin Joint Venture Group (OJVG) for its corporate responsibility and for providing financial support for this study through the ESIA of the Sabodala gold mine project. We also would like to thank Mark Vendrig (Consult 5, Inc.) for his continual encouragement and support. SRK Consulting contracted with SRI for cultural heritage services and, in addition to Mark Vendrig, Don Hovdebo and Dr. William Morrill, provided contractual oversight and direction. Richard Ciolek-Torrello (SRI) read and commented on earlier drafts of the paper. We also received comments on the baseline study from Dave Killick, who served as peer reviewer. Finally, we would like to thank the people of the OJVG concession who allowed us to into their lives, both current and past.

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


Figure 1. The OJVG Sabodala ESIA study area and vicinity; inset: historic polities around the study area (adapted from Mauny 1961).




Figure 2. The study area, showing the OJVG Sabodala concession, modern villages, and the ADI associated with proposed mining. (Note: Site 41, Bambaraya, is both a modern and a prehistoric village.)




Figure 3. The Masato site, showing the main site, Site 8. The top left inset shows the sites that constitute the complex. The depiction of features is schematic (not all features can be shown at this scale), and the central rectangle represents the enclosure, shown in more detail in the bottom right inset.